If people are increasingly turning to AI for information, and if AI companies continue not to pay those who collect, evaluate, and publish Information, then, sooner or later, there will be no solid information anymore.

Simply because trustworthy information will no longer be produced. Can’t be produced anymore. Because there is no one to pay for.

(By the way, the problem is exacerbated by social media platforms. Because the algorithm there is optimised to keep people coming back for more, consumers no longer go directly to news sites.)

So AI is killing trustworthy information; it systematically produces more disinformation and less truth.

This is how the market works today.

The winners: Digital platforms, as well as the misinformation producers that flood the internet with cheap AI-generated content and profit from engagement.

The losers: Quality news, public-interest journalism, and the public that depends on them.

But democracy needs informed citizens, right?

So what to do?

We have to change the rules of the market.

As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and his Columbia University colleague Maxim Ventura-Bolet have written in a paper called (The impact of AI and digital platforms on the information ecosystem) we don’t have to accept this situation.

But: The market will not self-correct because nobody is incentivised to act differently.

Only government intervention can stop the downward spiral.

Stiglitz and Ventura-Bolet argue that this should include

• regulated platform accountability for content amplification,

• enforced obligations to address coordinated disinformation campaigns, and

• intellectual-property protection for news producers.

Today, the information landscape is becoming increasingly polluted, fragmented, and manipulative.

This is the bad news.

The good news: We can change for the better. With better rules for information markets.

Some will warn against interventions in free markets. Others simply term such helpful regulations a social market economy.

See you in democracy,

Johannes Eber

If you don’t want to read the Stiglitz & Ventura-Bolet paper, Meg Tapia has written about the paper here. Tapia is the managing director of the national security consulting firm Novexus and an expert associate at the Australian National University’s National Security College.

Friend of Democracy,

Which policies matter to supporters of which parties in Germany? What do centre-right voters of the ruling CDU party want? And what about those of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)? What are the priorities of supporters of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, parts of which are far-right?

The economists Tobias Börger, Tim Lohse, Jürgen Meyerhoff, Salmai Qari and Andreas Stotland have investigated this question (paper available only in German) using a representative, survey-based choice experiment employing so-called best-worst scaling.

In this best-worst scaling method, participants are asked to repeatedly select what they consider to be the best and worst options from an experimentally generated list of alternatives. Consistent rankings can be derived from these repeated choices, enabling the quantification of relative preferences.

Participants could choose from 13 policy areas:

1 Education & Research (Bildung & Forschung)
2 Energy supply (Energieversorgung)
3 Food & Agriculture (Ernährung & Landwirtschaft)
4 Health & Care (Gesundheit & Pflege)
5 Infrastructure & Transport (Infrastruktur & Verkehr)
6 Home security (Innere Sicherheit)
7 Climate action (Klimaschutz)
8 Culture (Kultur)
9 Nature conservation and environmental protection (Natur- und Umweltschutz)
10 Pensions (Rente)
11 Social security benefits (Sozialleistungen)
12 Defence (Verteidigung)
13 Economy (Wirtschaft)

The results of the experiment are shown in the chart above.

Two key findings:

1. The importance citizens attach to different policy areas depends heavily on their party preference.

2. Policy areas that attract a great deal of public and media attention (such as defence and climate action) often do not feature prominently in the priority lists of individual voter groups.

The authors conclude:

“The analysis suggests that the government’s priorities do not necessarily align with the relative spending priorities of its own voter groups. This is particularly relevant where political strategies rely on significant shifts in resources or increases in spending, such as in the policy areas of defence and climate protection, which are considered of secondary importance by large sections of the electorate. Such discrepancies can heighten political disillusionment, weaken loyalty to established parties and thereby boost the appeal of opposition parties and, in particular, political fringe groups.”

So far for today.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Friend of Democracy,

What comes to mind when you think of Europe?

It stands for so many things. So much good. And so much bad. For the Enlightenment. For inventions. Conquest. Colonisation. Extermination. Also for democracy.

Today, 9 May, is Europe Day.

It commemorates the 1950 Schuman Declaration, when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed pooling European coal and steel production — the proposal that became the foundation of today’s European Union. It’s celebrated annually across the EU with open-door events at EU institutions, concerts, and civic activities.

How are you spending Europe Day?

Among other things, I was at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and attended an event organised by Pulse of Europe.

Let’s get out and make our voices heard.

Long live democratic Europe!

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

How can Germany maintain its prosperity?

Through immigration.

Conservative circles won’t like that. But that is an economic reality.

And not only that.

Since the potential for migration from within the European Union has been exhausted, immigration will increasingly come from third countries in the future.

These are two key findings from the three economists Herbert Brücker, Yuliya Kosyakova, and Enzo Weber, published in the German academic journal Wirtschaftsdienst (which covers German economic policy and for which I work).

Here are a few more key points.

The current situation in Germany:

“Seven million – that is how many workers Germany will lose over the next 15 years due to demographic change alone. The demographic impact has been negative for many years, resulting in a loss of more than 400,000 workers per year. In reality, however, the German labour market is only just beginning to shrink. Until now, this decline has been more than offset – by rising labour force participation among older people and women; and, above all, by immigration. But these compensatory mechanisms are increasingly reaching their limits.”

The authors argue that the notion that artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly taking over tasks, and that there is therefore little need for additional workers, is a fallacy:

“Digitalisation and AI are leading to far-reaching changes in jobs and work processes, but not to a decline in overall labour demand.”

The answer, therefore, is: migration – and that applies at all levels:

“It is often overlooked that migration increases the labour supply not only at the lower end of the skills spectrum, but also at the upper end. Depending on the period under review, the proportion of graduates among immigrants in Germany is just as high, or even higher, than in the population without a migrant background. This potential can be further strengthened, for example, through targeted support for international students and measures to encourage graduates to remain in the country.”

By the way: migration fosters innovation. To quote Brücker, Kosyakova and Weber one last time:

“Numerous studies show that migration and diversity boost productivity growth. Innovation often arises where knowledge from different contexts is brought together – a process that is fostered by migration.”

So, this article brings together two favourite topics in current German politics: migration and growth. However, the connection is not quite as some on the conservative side see it. But it is an economic fact: Migration and growth are often two sides of the same coin.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Friend of Democracy,

Across Germany, the current refrain is this: The Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz isn’t up to the job. The loudest voices are coming from the conservative camp—not least from within his own centre-right party, the CDU itself. We supported Merz; we gave him at least a fair chance, these critics argue. But now, they say, it has become clear that Merz is no reformer. Sure, the blame lies primarily with the coalition partner—the Social Democrats (SPD)—whose political vision renders them incapable of pulling the country out of the mire, they say, yet it also lies with Friedrich Merz, who is failing to keep the SPD in check.

This is the story being told by the conservative side: The “cart of Germany” is stuck in the mud, and Merz is not the right man to pull it out.

Some on the right side of the political spectrum may have only recently embraced this notion. Others, however, have been cultivating this narrative since the government’s inception. It is a narrative with a distant and clear objective: to pave the way for a right-wing conservative majority government. A very right-wing conservative government. Those within the CDU who pursue this goal do not say so openly—not yet, at least. For now, it remains a political taboo. Consequently, they are working to engineer a political climate in which such a constellation becomes the only viable path to power for the Union.

It appears that these people are well on their way to success. The governing CDU is currently doing a lot (through disputes with the coalition partner) to ensure the failure of the existing coalition, or, at the very least, to make a renewed coalition with the Social Democrats impossible following the next federal election. But with whom, then, could the CDU form a coalition? With the Greens? With the Left Party? With the Liberals (FDP), which is currently sinking into political irrelevance?

If the CDU continues on this path, only one potential coalition partner will remain: the Alternative for Germany (AfD)—a party that is, in part, openly right-wing extremist. That is the goal of some—and, I fear, of quite a few—within and around the Merz party. Then the argument will be that power cannot be left in the hands of the cranks to the left of centre; that, for the sake of the country’s future, one must bite the bullet and agree to cooperate with the AfD.

Friedrich Merz will, in all likelihood, not lead such a coalition as Federal Chancellor. He has decency. I just heard on the news that the AfD’s poll numbers in Saxony-Anhalt have risen once again. It is possible that the Union will no longer have to concern itself with the question of who, from within its own ranks, is to succeed Friedrich Merz as German Federal Chancellor.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Do you know Abiy Ahmed?

He has been the Prime Minister of Ethiopia since April 2018.

In 2018, shortly after taking office, he released political prisoners, allowed exiled opposition groups to return, opened up media restrictions, and made peace with neighbouring Eritrea after decades of hostility.

For his peace agreement with Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, he even received the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

And after that?

His leadership became highly controversial due to the Tigray conflict (2020–2022) — a devastating civil war between the federal government and the Tigray regional authorities. There are also accusations of human rights violations, and there are ongoing ethnic tensions across Ethiopia, plus economic difficulties and inflation.

Ethiopia has become much more politically restrictive in recent years compared to the optimism of 2018.

Obviously, Abiy Ahmed is far less a friend of democracy than he seemed to be.

This is a common pattern, isn‘t it? Friends of freedom and democracy become - when in power - the opposite.

Here is a simple rule:

Whether someone is a friend of democracy, i.e., supports the transfer of power, cannot be verified as long as they are in opposition and therefore fighting for a change in power; it can only be checked with those in power and their willingness to relinquish it.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

We can’t compare Nazi-Germany with the USA of today, can we?

Maybe we should.

Not because it’s the same. But because it could become similar.

Because people tend to be delusional. They hope things can’t go worse. They don’t recognise when things are getting worse, not when life deteriorates incrementally. Step by step.

In Germany, after the Nazi took power, most of the people thought that things would turn out well. We know it didn’t.

And in the USA of today?

Ian Buruma, author of The Colaborators, compares the situation (his father was a student in Nazi-occupied Netherlands and deported to Germany as a forced labourer) in the New York Times (gift article):

“I was told by a well-known American historian that there was really nothing to worry about, for after all, Roosevelt once had authoritarian tendencies, too. Democracy would never be shattered, a law professor assured me, for ‘Americans love freedom too much.’

Since then, one red line after another has been crossed: Undocumented immigrants are called animals; civilian boats are blown out of the water; American citizens are gunned down in the streets and then accused of being domestic terrorists; universities, news organizations and law firms are being bullied and blackmailed; and refugees are deported to countries whose languages they probably don’t even speak. And that is aside from the blatant corruption of family and cronies.

All this was incremental, too, but compared with 1934, everything goes much faster. And yet life continues as usual. What was unthinkable only yesterday we now take in stride, and we wait for that moment when things really have gone too far this time, when the fever breaks and things will revert to normal.

But that moment probably won’t come. Things have gone too far too many times already. Hoping for better is still the right attitude, but only as long as we prepare for the worst.”

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Would Putin’s Russia have invaded Ukraine (exactly four years ago) if the international community had reacted differently to Putin’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, if it had given Ukraine more support and imposed tougher sanctions on Putin after 2014?

We in Germany have a particular perspective on this issue. We have the history of a 12-year Nazi dictatorship nine decades ago.

Back then, after Hitler seized power in 1933, hardly any country stood up to Hitler until it was too late.

The British author and historian James Hawes writes in „The Shortest History of Germany“:

„Only the spinelessness of the other powers allowed this vile regime to survive and grow. After 1919, America was clearly the most powerful nation on earth. If it had remained committed to an active role in the world, no German leader would have believed he could revise the result of World War I by force. Instead, the USA failed to step up to the international plate, opting instead for isolationism. Russia had been traumatised by revolution and famine, and was now in the grip of Stalin’s murderous Great Terror. Stalin was terrified of provoking the German attack he knew would someday come. An exhausted Britain simply couldn’t believe that anyone in Germany actually wanted another war; until 1938, its leaders stayed fatuously convinced that if they treated Germany fairly — generously — Hitler would be satisfied. France was even more scared by war and was so torn by internal left-right political conflict that many Frenchmen feared the German army less than their own communists. This non-opposition handed Hitler triumph after triumph, when any real resistance would have soon finished him.“

So, the answer to the question of whether the democratic West could have prevented Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is: probably yes.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Today, a few general thoughts on the situation in Europe.

It is often said these days that a new world order is in the making.

A world order with fewer and fewer nations working together for the better of all sides. And a world to come with a few large states calling the shots and asserting their interests against those of others. Less cooperation, more confrontation, so to speak.

That may be so.

To me, the interesting question is about the long term: which world order will prevail? That of cooperation or that of the ruthless pursuit of individual interests?

There is some scientific evidence that cooperation is superior to confrontation in human coexistence. Evolutionary theory once emphasised competition (”survival of the fittest”), but modern research shows that cooperation is a powerful evolutionary strategy.

Three short examples.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates that while defection can win in the short term, mutual cooperation produces higher long-term payoffs.

In repeated interactions (iterated games), strategies like Tit for Tat (cooperate first, then reciprocate) perform best.

Political scientist Robert Axelrod showed in computer tournaments that cooperative strategies outperform purely aggressive ones when interactions are ongoing.

I will not go into further detail about the examples above. They are intended only to demonstrate that people who cooperate within groups often outcompete purely selfish groups.

Which brings me to the current situation in Europe.

Europe consists of many small and medium-sized states. Experience has taught them that cooperation is superior to conflict.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the power claims of China’s dictatorship, and the populism and extremism of Donald Trump have brought Europe even closer together.

For example, today, Europe is practically single-handedly shouldering the foreign financing of Ukraine’s defence following the almost complete withdrawal of the US. At the same time, it is expanding its own defence capabilities.

“We have to understand that in the era of big powers, our freedom is no longer a given. It is at stake. We will need to show firmness and determination to assert this freedom,”

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said this week at the Munich Security Conference.

Nutshell: The new realities are not only sinking in among politicians and the general public in Europe, but strong and necessary reactions are also taking place and becoming visible. Democracies are sometimes a little slower in this regard. It could be fast enough.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Friend of Democracy,

Today, just a photo from last week’s travelling through Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia (I took the picture at the train station of Prijedor in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and a quote by Maya Angelou:

“Perhaps travel cannot prevent bigotry, but by demonstrating that all peoples cry, laugh, eat, worry, and die, it can introduce the idea that if we try and understand each other, we may even become friends.”

Maya Angelou was an American poet, memoirist, and civil rights activist best known for her autobiographical book ‚I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings‘ (1969), which powerfully depicts her early life and experiences with racism and resilience.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

It has probably never been easier to create a life of prosperity for ourselves than it is today.

Not least because we are more educated than ever before. In Europe, about 99 per cent of adults can read and write — the result of a historical process.

More.

Compulsory primary education laws spread across Europe between 1800 and 1900. It was because states realised literacy was crucial for industrial labour, military conscription, taxation and administration. Railways, newspapers, and cheap printing made reading practically useful.

It didn‘t stop with literacy.

After 1945 and especially after 1970, Universities expanded rapidly. Student grants and free or low-cost tuition became available in many countries.

How has it changed in numbers?

Before 1950, typically 1 to 5 per cent of the population attended university. Today, 40-45 per cent of younger European adults (aged 25-34) have completed tertiary education.

Nutshell:

We are more educated and better able to take control of our own destiny than ever before.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

In Portugal, Antonio José Seguro of the centre-left Socialist Party has secured a landslide victory and a five-year term as Portugal’s president.

Why is this important?

63-year-old Seguro, who is a former leader of Portugal’s Socialist Party, beat his far-right, anti-establishment rival, Andre Ventura, in a run-off vote. Seguro had won more than 65 per cent of the vote to Ventura’s 34 per cent, with more than 90 per cent of districts reporting.

So the extremist far-right has been beaten devastatingly?

Well. Ventura is the first extreme-right candidate to reach a run-off vote in Portugal. Second, with his 34 per cent of the vote, he is still likely to secure a much stronger result than the 22.8 per cent his anti-immigration Chega party achieved in last year’s general election. Third, despite his loss on Sunday, the 43-year-old Ventura, a charismatic former television sports commentator, can now boast increased support, reflecting the growing influence of the far right in Portugal and much of Europe.

Back to the winner and the new presidency, how powerful is the president of Portugal?

Executive power is mainly with the government, led by the prime minister. The president stands above day-to-day politics and acts as a guardian of the Constitution and political stability. They can dissolve parliament and call early elections (this has been done multiple times in modern Portugal). And they appoint the prime minister (usually the leader of the largest parliamentary majority, but not automatically).

In a nutshell:

Voters in Portugal have spoken out emphatically against populism and right-wing extremism. However, this does not mean that such anti-democratic politics are on the decline in Portugal.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

When you cross the border from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia (as I did this week in Metković in the south of Croatia), one thing becomes very obvious: The standard of living in Croatia is significantly higher than it is in its neighboring country. The roads are better developed, and the houses are larger and plastered.

A number:

Croatia’s nominal GDP per capita is roughly 2.5 to almost 3 times higher than Bosnia and Herzegovina’s.

nominal GDP > a country’s total economic output measured at current market prices, divided by its population, without adjusting for inflation or differences in cost of living

Why is it so?

Croatia has one of the longest coastlines in Europe. The mainland coastline is about 1,777 km. If you include the many islands, it is 5,835 km. So there is a lot of room for people wanting to make a holiday by the sea.

More numbers.

Croatia records more than 20 million tourist arrivals every year, which is five times its population. In 2024, foreign tourists generated nearly €15 billion in revenue for Croatia, a record high and an increase from previous years. The country on the Dalmatian Coast is, therefore, a good example of how peaceful coexistence and unrestricted freedom of movement can bring prosperity to a country.

See you in Democracy.

Today, just a photo I took this week on a hiking tour near the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the city whose siege (the longest in modern history; 1.425 days) ended 30 years ago and which has since been a free city in a democratic country.

See you in Democracy.

More than 30 years ago, on 14 December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed.

What is that?

It was about ending the Bosnian War and defining how Bosnia and Herzegovina would function as a state afterwards.

What war?

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted from 1992 to 1995 and involved Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. It was marked by ethnic cleansing, sieges (like Sarajevo), and mass atrocities.

So the war has been over for a long time. But:

I am currently in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The city was besieged for almost four years by Serbia and Bosnian Serbs. About 11,000 people died. Still, bullet holes can be seen in unrenovated houses, plaques with names and dates of birth and death commemorate the dead everywhere, and on the outskirts of the city, you can see destroyed and abandoned houses.

How did the war end?

In mid–1995, Bosnian government forces and Croat forces launched successful offensives, rolling back earlier Serb gains. At the same time, NATO carried out Operation Deliberate Force, a sustained air campaign against Bosnian Serb military targets. Together, these actions broke the stalemate and made continued fighting untenable. The mix of military pressure and intense international diplomacy culminated in the Dayton Peace Agreement.

How can a country live in peace when its people have been fighting and killing each other for years?

This is the question I‘ve been asking myself since I arrived here.

A clue:

The Dayton agreement froze the conflict. But daily life wasn‘t. Kids went to school. People needed jobs, buses, doctors, and coffee. Markets, weddings, funerals force contact. Maybe it is that simple. Over time, survival routines create a sense of functional peace, even when trust is thin.

What do I mean by „the conflict was frozen“?

Dayton made Bosnia and Herzegovina a single sovereign state divided into two entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska—with a special self-governing Brčko District. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member collective presidency (one Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb) and multiple layers of government designed to balance ethnic power. The system, created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, prioritises preventing renewed conflict but often results in political paralysis and ethnic vetoes.

So no progress?

There is. But it is slow. Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina is called normalisation. Mixed cities function, economies interlink, people travel, marry, and work across ethnic lines—things like that. Plus: Younger generations are less invested in wartime identities, even if they inherit the system built around them.

The result:

No return to war. Three decades of peace matter more than they sound.

See you in Democracy.

Hardly.

The next general (parliamentary) elections in Hungary are scheduled for 12 April 2026. This election will determine all 199 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly (Országgyűlés) for the new legislative term.

What does this have to do with Victor Orbán?

In Hungary, the prime minister is not elected directly by voters. Instead, it’s a parliamentary election process.

Tell me more.

Once Parliament is formed after the election, the President of Hungary formally nominates a candidate for prime minister. Parliament then votes on that candidate. A simple majority (more than half of all members of the parliament, i.e. at least 100 votes) is required.

What are Victor Orbán’s chances?

Viktor Orbán is a member of Fidesz (full name is Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance). This national-conservative, right-wing populist party has been the dominant force in Hungarian politics since 2010, governing in alliance with the smaller Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).

So?

Current polls suggest a tight and competitive race — and in many surveys, the ruling Fidesz party of Viktor Orbán is trailing or narrowly behind opposition forces.

What opposition?

Many polls show the new opposition party “Tisza” (Tisztelet és Szabadság) leading Fidesz in voting intention, sometimes by several percentage points. In a current aggregate trend, Tisza stands at about 45 % vs. 42 % for Fidesz/KDNP.

Why is Orbán losing support among voters?

For years, many voters backed Orbán because life felt predictable and stable. That perception has cracked.

More.

There was high inflation in 2022–2023; among the worst in the EU. Real wages were falling, and purchasing power was shrinking. And there is a weakness in the currency, the Forint, making imports and travel more expensive. Plus: Hungary depends heavily on EU funds. Because of rule-of-law disputes: Billions of euros are frozen. Many voters don’t love the EU, but they do notice when money doesn’t arrive.

So there is hope for change for the better in Hungary, right?

Right.

See you in Democracy.

About 30 per cent of Germans believe in conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories are the bedrock of populist parties.

Because those who subscribe to conspiracy theories believe the narrative that a small elite suppresses the will of the people.The story of the deep state. The story of how the few deceive the many.

But here comes something strange:

While support for populist parties has been growing for years, the number of conspiracy adherents has remained unchanged.

Why is that?

Because non-populist parties no longer attract voters with conspiracy theories. They have found a new home. In Germany, it is the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This is where their new peer group is.

It is unlikely that large parts of them will return to non-populist parties.

What helps?

Reducing the number of people who subscribe to conspiracy theories.

This will not be achieved by simply providing more factual information. Rather, these people need opportunities to change their peer group. Without losing face. Without accusation. Simply by realising that they feel more at home in a social world that does not need conspiracy theories.

We should welcome these people.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Why are people in affluent societies often no happier than those in less affluent societies?

Basic economics has an explanation.

Basic economics deals with relative scarcity. People use their available resources in such a way as to maximise their utility. Homo economicus, in other words.

So they choose what is best for them. But that automatically means that they can‘t select other opportunities.

In economic terms, there are costs of the things one can’t do.

This is where the term ‘opportunity cost’ comes into play.

Opportunity costs are calculated from the difference between the utility of the (chosen) best alternative and the (unchosen) second-best alternative.

Someone who buys a new car may not be able to go on a winter holiday. Beacuse the budget is limited. The actual benefit of buying the car is therefore not the benefit of driving the new car, but from the benefit of driving the new car minus the fun of being on a winter holiday.

This sounds like economics, and, yeah, it is, but it also reflects the reality of life. Possibilities might be unlimited, but life is limited.

Now we get to the point.

As a society becomes wealthier, not only does the benefit of the decisions made increase, but so does the potential benefit of those not made. Karl Homann and Andreas Suchanek write in ‚Ökonomie eine Einfürhung‘ (’Economics – An Introduction’):

“To exaggerate slightly, one could say that scarcity in this sense, namely as relative scarcity, is not a problem of shortage, but of abundance.”

In other words, as prosperity increases, so do opportunity costs, everything we cannot do.

So the rise in prosperity has an obvious downside. We may be getting more things, but there are still many more we don’t get.

Digitalisation does the rest. We are constantly reminded of what we don’t have. Paragliding in the Alps. The latest PlayStation. A fulfilled life on a farm in the wild. Bright white teeth. Our screen shows us all around the clock what we could have if we had (even) more money and time.

The latter even affects the wealthiest people, who supposedly can afford everything. Form them as well, a day has 24 hours.

Time scarcity most strikingly demonstrates the high opportunity costs of our affluent lives. We could do so much if only we had more time!

But we don’t. Days are and life is limited.

What to do?

There is this simple advice: Don’t focus on the opportunity costs, but on what we actually do.

If you buy a car, enjoy driving it. Don’t think about the fancy skiing holiday you missed out on. If you treat yourself to lunch at a restaurant, enjoy it. If you go to the cinema instead of buying a book, don’t mourn the book reading, even if you don’t like the film.

There is no point in living in the world of opportunity costs, letting your thoughts revolve around the question: What could I have done? Those who ask “what if” suffer from today’s increase in possibilities. Those who instead look at what actually is will find happiness in prosperity.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber

Have you ever heard of Richard A. Easterlin? He lived from 1926 to 2024 and was an American economist, best known for founding the modern field of happiness economics.

He is especially famous for identifying the Easterlin Paradox, one of the most influential findings in the study of well-being and economic growth.

Here is what Easterlin found out:

Within a country, richer people tend to be happier than poorer people. But over the decades, average happiness does not rise in step with GDP (which stands for Gross Domestic Product and indicates a country’s total material prosperity).

These two findings seem to contradict each other. If income makes individuals happier, then as everyone gets richer over time, the whole society should become happier too. But decades of data often show little or no long-term increase in average national happiness despite significant increases in wealth.

Why?

Here is the most likely explanation. To be more precise, there are two:

First, people quickly get used to higher income or living standards. Second, happiness depends partly on how much you earn compared to others, not just on absolute income levels.

What can we learn from the results?

If we want to be happy, we mustn’t adapt too easily to better circumstances, for example, by reminding ourselves how things could be, how they might have been in the past. And we shouldn’t compare ourselves with others so much. At least not if we are among the few rich people in a group. ;-)

Best,

Johannes Eber

There is a group within Germany’s conservative ruling party, the CDU/CSU, that has one goal: to see the current coalition government fail. Campaigns to this end can be recognised by the fact that they badmouth pretty much everything the coalition government of CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats (SPD) does. This is because this conservative group sees much greater common ground with the opposition and far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) positions.

I know, history does not repeat itself exactly. But we can sometimes learn from history.

The right-wing conservative DNVP, which became the second strongest force behind the SPD in the 1924 Reichstag elections in Germany, allied with the NSDAP in 1928. The latter had won a mere 3.0 per cent of the vote in 1924 and only 2.6 per cent in 1928.

In his book ‘The Shortest History of Germany‘, James Hawes writes about the DNVP:

“It was the DNVP that made Hitler. The party could call on proud old names and wealthy donors, but it was so decidedly Prussian – and hence Protestant – that it had never appealed much even to right-wing voters in other regions of Germany. The new leader, media tycoon and former Krupp board member Alfred Hugenberg, decided that the Nazis were really just a smaller, rougher version of the DNVP with useful hard-core grassroots activists. Thugs, yes, but our thugs. What if the hard-talking, modern-seeming, but essentially conservative brownshirts could deliver some votes from the rest of Germany, leaving their social superiors, the top-hatted DNVP, natural rulers of East Elbia, as the real power in the land? This delusion persisted right up to the day Franz von Papen, the last Chancellor before Hitler, gave his famous last words of assurance to his colleagues on 4 January 1933: ‘We’ve hired Hitler.’”

As I said, what happened will not be repeated one-to-one. The idea that the AfD could become part of a government or tolerate a minority government is more than I want to imagine.

See you in Democracy,

Johannes Eber